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Abstract 
The objective of this study is to examine whether the current global financial crisis has 
impacted the Malaysian banking stocks. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) 
was used as a proxy for the crisis and it was ascertained that there was a strong 
relationship between the DJIA and the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI). 
Statistical analysis was then performed on the KLCI and selected banking stocks 
which indicated that there was a strong and positive correlation between the two 
variables. The findings support the aim of this study - that the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis has indeed impacted the Malaysian banking stocks. 
JEL classifications: C20, G10 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the impact of the current global financial crisis on the 
Malaysian banking stocks. Amongst its contagion effects, the stock market 
collapse is deemed to be a key dynamic consequence of this crisis. Previous 
research1 had established that the country’s financial sector and the stock market 
index returns influence future economic growth. Since the financial market health 
depends crucially on stock market stability and banks are generally viewed to play 
a very crucial role in crystallizing the country’s economic performance, this study 
will look at how the Malaysian banking stocks have reacted to the current global 
financial crisis. 
 
      How to measure the global financial crisis is a central question that may arise. 
The DJIA was used as a proxy for the financial crisis and a trend analysis was 
done between the DJIA and the KLCI to establish that the KLCI is directly 
impacted by the DJIA movements. The resultant chart2 evidences that the changes 
in the two indices moves in tandem with one another. Statistical analysis was also 
performed on these two variables, outcome of which indicates that there is a 
significant positive correlation between the DJIA and the KLCI.  
 
      Since the banking sector stocks are categorized under the KL Financial Index 
(KLFI), a study of this sector index and five other major sector indices ( viz.  KL 
Plantation Index, KL Industrial Index, KL Consumer Index, KL Property Index 
and the KL Construction Index ) was also undertaken in order to establish that 
there is a link between the KLFI and the KLCI. Based on the data obtained for the 
period 1st January 2007 till 1st December 2008, the strength of the relationship of 
each sector’s index change was evaluated against the change in the KLCI. The 
outcome revealed that all six sectors had a significant positive correlation with the 
KLCI. 
                                                    
1
 Rebel A Cole, Friborz Moshirian, Qiongbing Wu, Bank stock returns and economic growth, Journal 
of banking and finance (2008) 995 - 1007 
2
 Chart 1 – Closing indices for DJIA and KLCI for the period Jan 2007 to Dec 2008 
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            Having firmly established that the KLCI could be used as a proxy for the 
financial crisis, in the context of Malaysia, and that the KLFI is indeed linked to 
the KLCI, the statistical study then proceeded to investigate the dynamic relations 
between the changes in the stock prices of selected banks and the changes in the 
KLCI. Here too, the issue that arose was which of the banking stocks to select.  
Not leaving it to a game of chance e.g. “Eeny, Meeny, Miny, Moe…,” criteria for 
selection was (a) banks with the largest market capitalisation (b) most active bank 
stocks and (c) at least one representation from the medium-sized and the smaller 
banks.  
       
       Investors, whether they are institutions, fund managers or individuals, will 
react to the crisis and either buy in order to add onto their stock portfolio or sell, in 
order to lock in their profits or cut their losses. The institutions refer to a gamut of 
information ranging from financial data, charts, analysis and other financial 
statistics while from the viewpoint of the average individual investor – he would 
probably look at the easily available and understood information to arrive at his 
decision – “to buy or not to buy” or conversely “to sell or not to sell”. He could 
probably sell when the stock markets reel or if he does not believe in cutting his 
losses, he may hold on for the market to rebound. All this leads to prediction of the 
future. Since it is impossible to conclusively predict the future, all investors need 
to refer to historical prices and indices as well as predictive information to assist in 
their decision making. Knowing the intensity of the level to which the bank stock 
has been impacted by the global financial crisis, decisions based on statistically 
proven analysis, will be a better basis for the investors’ decision making rather 
than relying on “a gut feeling”. This is in fact the objective of this study. 
 
       This study contributes to the literature on the reaction of the Malaysian 
banking stocks during a financial crisis, by documenting a significant link between 
bank stocks and the KLCI. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In 
Section 2 is a very detailed background of the financial crisis, what caused it, how 
it has affected the financial markets and its impact on Malaysia. Section 3 presents 
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the research methodology while Section 4 describes how the data collection was 
obtained. The findings are detailed in Section 5 and it concludes in Section 6. 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section will focus on the causes of the 2007-2008 global financial crises 
which have sent virulent vibrations throughout various sectors of crisis-hit 
economies. 
 
      Since the crisis is a recent development and is still unraveling, there is a 
scarcity of published research. In all probability the many researches and studies 
that are being done are yet to be published. Remaining undaunted by this 
constraint, I had to resort to obtaining information from analysts and newspaper 
reports, as well as articles published by various authorities, bodies e.g. IMF. 
. 
2.1 Causes of the financial crisis 
The widely accepted cause is that the trigger was the meltdown of the United 
States (US) subprime mortgage issue. According to Dr. Michael Lim Mah Hui3, 
the dynamics in fact started with what he termed as the “Triple Witches Brew” – a 
triple and lethal combination comprising of, firstly the housing bubble in the US 
and the UK, secondly the financial innovations and thirdly the spiraling 
commodity market. Reports and articles may depict a confusing picture, all too 
often emphasizing on different aspects of the crisis. This paper will adopt a four-
fold way to explain the various dimensions of the crisis. 
 
2.1.1    The Housing Bubble  
Firstly, when the housing bubble burst in the US and the UK, it resulted in huge 
erosion in asset values and therefore capital and wealth.  
  
       In the US, the Federal Reserve encouraged a situation of excessive liquidity 
since 2000. This cheap money allowed for a spiraling increase in the demand for 
housing as well as in consumer spending. Imprudent banking lending practices by 
                                                    
3
 Dr Michael Lim,  “Global Financial Crisis and Impact on Malaysia” 5th August 2008 
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banks allowed for subprime loans to be extended to weak credit borrowers using 
teasers like “adjustable rate mortgages” (ARM), low / zero down payments and 
loose documentation. A total of USD1.5 trillion sub primes had been booked in 
2004-2005. 
 
      The US housing market became a USD20 trillion industry. Comparatively, 
household wealth was a staggering USD45 trillion, with housing mortgages 
comprising USD10 trillion, of which 25% or USD2.5 trillion was under subprime 
financing. Even more alarming was the fact that 22% of the houses were for 
investment i.e. possible speculation and a further 14% were for vacation homes. 
Under this scenario, the median house prices rose by 40% to USD234,000 over the 
period 2000 till 2006. Invariably the US housing bubble burst in early 2007 – for 
the first time since the Great Depression4 of 1929, with house prices falling by 
almost 20% and further expected falls in 2008. With every fall of 10%, it 
effectively shaved off USD2 trillion from household wealth. Since 70% of the US 
growth had been powered by consumption, the erosion of spending power had dire 
consequences. Published statistics revealed that the average US consumer has 
almost near zero savings and inevitably, borrowers defaulted in their loan and 
other financial obligations.  
 
      UK was an equally overheated housing market with house prices tripling 
between the years 1996–2007. The average median house price was GDP350,000– 
which is 6 times the average salary (2007) compared to 3 times the average salary 
(2003). The consumer debt in the UK was far more acute than in the US–the 
former being 166% of gross disposable income while the latter registered 127%. 
When the overheated housing bubble burst in the UK, housing prices fell by 10% 
in 2007 with further falls between 20–30% expected in 2008. A resultant effect of 
this was that 40% of the house sale agreements collapsed due to the inability of the 
buyers to source mortgage financing as banks went into credit crunch mode and 
tightened controls and lending criteria. 
 
                                                    
4
 Source: Richard Duncan, Finance Asia , Sept 2007 
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      With rising defaults on housing mortgage payments, losses began to be 
reported   by financial institutions. The various financial innovation products e.g. 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO), and other securitization of loans (which 
had been given inaccurate ratings) were in fact backed by mortgages. The default 
in the mortgages caused a domino effect on these “innovative products” which 
consequently led to the eventual collapse of the financial institutions. The US 
financial giant Lehman Brothers succumbed under the credit default in the swaps 
and mortgage markets. Share markets plummeted and today stock markets are 
down by 40%-60% as compared to the early part of this year.  
 
2.1.2    Collapse of financial institutions 
The second dimension is the actual failure of the financial institution. In the US, 
three of the earliest banks to signal distress were Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. Similarly in the UK one of the earliest banks to collapse was 
Northern Rock. However it was not until the failure of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008, that panic buttons hit the stock markets which plunged to record 
lows as selling pressure mounted. For the week starting 6 October 2008, the DJIA 
closed lower for all 5 days, falling over 1,874 points or 18%. It was the worst 
weekly decline ever. 24th October 2008 saw many of the world’s stock exchanges 
experiencing the worst declines for many years. Table 1 overleaf shows the 
performance of some of the regional stock markets on Black Friday 24th October, 
2008. 
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      Table 1:  PERFORMANCE OF REGIONAL STOCK MARKETS 
 
Bourse 
*Closing 
as at  24 
October 
2008 
(points) 
*Lowest 
level 
since 
^Highest 
index 
during 
2007 / 
2008 
^% 
drop 
Australian 
Securities Exchange 7,649.10 Nov '04 NA NA 
Dow Jones 
Industrial Average 8,683.31 Jun’03 
14,092.43 
15 Oct’07 62% 
Hang Seng Index 12,618.40 Aug '04 
30,986.22 
29 Oct’07 59% 
Jakarta Composite 
Index 1,244.90 Jun '06 
2,831.25 
14 Jan’07 56% 
Kospi 938.81 May’05 
2,043.93 
15 Oct’07 54% 
Kuala Lumpur 
Composite Index 859.11 Oct '04 
1,514.31 
14 Jan’07 43% 
Nikkei 225 7,649.10 Apr '03 
17,399.67 
15 Oct’07 56% 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 1,839.60 Nov '06 
5,934.77 
15 Oct’07 69% 
Straits Times Index 1,594.30 Sep '03 
3,886.93 
15 Oct’07 59% 
Taiwan Taipei 
Exchange 4,579.60 May’03 
9,743.73 
29 Oct’07 53% 
Thailand Stock 
Exchange 432.91 Jun '03 NA NA 
Sources : *Bloomberg  and ^Yahoo Finance      
 
 
2.1.3    Credit crunch 
Credit crunch was the third manifestation – with financial institutions being over 
cautious and unwilling to extend credit. The reason for this is that more than any 
other business, the financial institutions need capital to operate. They cannot lend 
if their balance sheet has been wiped out or impaired due to large losses. What 
they need to do is to reduce their debt and build up their capital base. This process 
is called de-leveraging and it will hurt all aspects of the economy that is correlated 
with the financial system. Governments world-wide have flooded their financial 
markets with liquidity to combat this issue. 
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2.1.4    Combined effect 
 Fourthly, is the combined effect of the above three forces in the wake of 
collapsing aggregate demand. What this means is that the world economy has 
entered into economic recession and the Governments must take immediate and 
effective efforts to avoid a prolonged recession. One such attempt is the stimulus 
package, which has to be sizeable for it to have a positive effect, in order to re-
ignite the economy. 
 
2.2 Was Alan Greenspan the author of the crisis? 
Many critics blame the former chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Alan 
Greenspan for the financial crisis. According to them, Greenspan encouraged the 
bubble in housing prices by keeping the interest rates too low for too long and that 
he also failed to rein in the explosive growth of risky and often fraudulent 
mortgage lending. Greenspan had also as far back as 1994, opposed the proposed 
regulations on derivatives. The immense and largely unregulated business of 
spreading financial risk widely, through the exotic derivatives, had gotten out of 
control, fuelling the financial markets and finally added havoc to the financial 
crisis. According to Greenspan, the crisis has turned out to be much broader than 
anything he ever imagined and admitted that he had failed to anticipate the self 
destructive power of wanton mortgages. However, he places far more blame on 
the Wall Street companies that aggressively pushed the mortgage backed securities 
saying, “Without the excessive demand from the securitizers, subprime mortgage 
originations would have been far smaller and the defaults far lower.” 
 
2.3 Impact on the world economies 
Moving on as to how the financial crisis has impacted the world economies – the 
US economy is expected to move into stagflation while the Asian economies are 
expected to slowdown. Governments world-wide are looking into stimulus 
packages as a catalyst to re-ignite their economies. Economists expect the US to 
lead with a stimulus package of USD1 trillion. Japan’s response is a USD255 
billion package to combat the financial tsunami while Australia has to date 
announced a total of AUD15.1 billion for their nation-building plan. World trade 
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is expected to shrink leading to the issues of rise in unemployment rate, especially 
in the finance industry. Bank of America5 has announced 35,000 job cuts for the 
next 3 years while Citibank plans to eliminate 52,000 jobs by 2009. According to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in their World Economic Outlook 2008 
publication, the world output will contract significantly in 2009. Table 2 overleaf 
shows the projected world output for 2009, as a result of the global crisis:- 
 
      Table 2: Projected world output6 in 2009 
` 
2.4 Impact on Malaysia  
Malaysia cannot be insulated from the global financial crisis and the same 
concerns that exist for the other economies are mirrored for us. A quote from Tun 
                                                    
5
  Reuters, New Straits Times report dated 13 December 2008 
6
  Source: International Monetary Fund, October 2008 
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Dr. Mahathir7 (former Prime Minster, Malaysia), “If the Government does not 
study the financial crisis properly, their plan will be merely “cosmetic changes.” 
What he was driving at was that the Malaysian Government must take effective 
measures to counter the crisis including making unpopular and hurtful decisions.  
 
      Estimates of the economic growth for 2009 according to an undated article in 
the Malaysian Finance blog spot is that the Malaysian merchandise trade surplus 
will fall to USD22.9 billion (RM82 billion) in 2009 from an estimated USD 5.3 
billion(2008). According to a newspaper report, the October exports saw a 
downturn of 2.6 per cent to RM53.46 billion; the total merchandise trade was  
RM97.3 billion for the 10 months – mainly attributed to the lower demand for 
electronic and electrical products and commodities. HSBC Bank economist 
described the export data as “the worst in more than 20 months.” While the current 
account posted a RM61 billion surplus, this figure is expected to drop once the 
demand for Malaysian exports reduces. 
 
      Meanwhile the spotlight on the finance industry in Malaysia from various 
analysts was that “Rough times ahead for Malaysia.”8 The credit crunch will lead 
to slower loan growth and profit forecasts will be severely reduced. Non- 
performing loans are expected to increase and the individual banks will have to 
manage their net loans/deposits and the net assets/total assets ratios. According to 
the same report, domestic banks are not directly exposed to the US subprime 
crisis-due to the Malaysian government’s ruling limiting the outflow of foreign 
investments. An Association of Bank Malaysia source9  said that the country was 
not experiencing any credit crunch and was of the view that the banking sector 
remains strong and well-capitalized.  
 
                                                    
7
 Quoted in New Straits Times, 12 December 2008 
8
 Sahamas stock forum, 18 October 2008 
9
 Souce: Horizonmy: Investment blog 3 November 2008 
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      According to Sahamas, the biggest leading indicator of financial health is the 
stock market and that the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) is the best 
performing stock market in South East Asia, meaning that it has fallen the least.  
        
      Findings of Mansor H. Ibrahim10 in his research was that the health of the 
banking sector depends crucially on the stock market stability.. 
 
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Model specification: 
Main assumption made in this study is that the DJIA is a proxy for the financial 
crisis and that the movements in the DJIA are a reflection of the various events 
and occurrences that have impacted the stock exchange. 
 
      While the analysis was done via SPSS, the mathematical formula for 
computing the correlation is as follows:- 
 
 
 
where n represents the pair of data x and y. The quantity r, called the linear 
correlation coefficient, measures the strength of the correlation viz. the direction 
of a linear relationship between x and y. The linear coefficient is sometimes 
referred to as the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient in honor of its 
developer Karl Pearson. 
 
      Should the outcome be a positive correlation, it would mean that the variables 
x and y have a strong positive linear correlation where r is close to +1. In the event 
the result was a negative correlation where r is negative, it would mean that the 
variables x and y have a strong negative linear correlation i.e. when the value for x 
                                                    
10
 Journal of Applied Economics, 2006, Stock Prices and Bank Loan Dynamics in a developing 
country: Malaysia 
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increases the value for y decreases. A no correlation situation would mean that 
there is no linear or a very weak linear correlation, where r is close to 0. A perfect 
correlation of ± 1 occurs only when the data points all lie exactly on a straight line. 
 
   The KLCI is the Malaysian equivalent of the DJIA and the first analysis done 
was to establish whether both these variables had a relationship. The sample size 
of the data was taken from January 2007–December 2008 coinciding with the time 
when the simmering of the financial crisis began. Firstly, the impact of the DJIA 
on the KLCI was examined where the month end closing indices of both were 
plotted on a graph to determine the trend of the movements of the two indices. 
(Please refer to Chart 1: Month End Indices for DJIA and KLCI). Then the 
variance of the DJIA (expressed as a percentage of the previous closing figure) 
was plotted against the variance of the KLCI and a similar trend analysis was 
undertaken. ( Please refer to Chart 2: Variances in the Month End Indices for 
DJIA and KLCI).  Finally a statistical analysis (via correlation) of these variables 
was undertaken (using the SPSS) to ascertain the strength of the relationship 
between these two quantifiable variables. 
 
       For the second analysis, the sector indices, including the KLFI, was similarly 
tested against the KLCI to ascertain the strength of their relationship. The reason 
why the KL Financial was selected was because the banks are categorised under 
this broad financial sector. If it were true that the health of the banking sector 
depended on the stock market stability then the results would show a close 
relationship between these two sets of variables 
  
            For the third analysis, six banking stocks were selected, using the 
parameters, which were stated earlier viz :- (a) high market capitalisation (b) most 
active stocks and (c) at least one representation from the medium-sized and the 
smaller banks.  Table 3 below depicts how the six banks met the selection criteria. 
Expected outcome of the statistical analysis is that the share prices of the banks are 
expected to move together with the KLCI – viz. when the KLCI falls, as in the 
12 
 
 
 
case of this crisis, the share prices too would fall and when the KLCI recovers, the 
share prices would rise.                                        
 
Table 3: Selection criteria of the banking stocks  
Bank High market 
capitalisation
11
 
RM Billion 
Appears 
weekly as 
most active 
stock 
Category 
Malayan Banking 
Berhad (Maybank) 
25.63 Yes Large 
Bumiputra-
Commerce Holdings 
Berhad (Commerce 
20.23 Yes Large 
Public Bank Berhad 
(PBB) 
20.33  Yes Large 
AMMB Holdings 
Berhad (AMMB) 
6.29  Yes Medium 
RHB Capital Berhad 
(RHB) 
8.18 Sometimes Medium 
Affin Bank Berhad 
(Affin) 
1.87 Sometimes Small 
       
4.0 DATA COLLECTION 
There was no primary data, only secondary data. Data was to be collected for  
DJIA, KLCI and the various sectors as well as the share prices of the selected 
banks. Many attempts were made to source the historical data from the Bursa 
Saham and Bank Negara Malaysia websites. It was disappointing that the 
information was not readily available despite many variations in the inquiries. 
Finally, the majority of the required data was accessed from the Yahoo Finance 
website12 under “historical prices.”  
 
      The user friendly website allowed for options in selection of the required data–
daily, weekly or monthly. Further, the data could be downloaded into spreadsheet 
for further processing purposes.  
 
                                                    
11
   Source New Straits Times dated 15 December 2008 
12In order to access the website type in Yahoo Financ
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      All data collected was for the period January 2007 till December 2008.  Month 
end closing indices were obtained for DJIA and the KLCI while for the banking 
stocks, the month end closing share price was used. The data for the sector indices 
sector indices was not available online and for this I had to request the assistance 
of my remisier. His contribution for this research is the month end sector indices 
data. 
 
5.0 FINDINGS 
The study of the first set of data (viz. the DJIA and the KLCI indices) was to 
establish that the KLCI is impacted by the financial crisis, using the proxy DJIA. 
A graph was plotted to ascertain the trends of the indices.  
Chart 1: Month End Indices for DJIA and KLCI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
From the results it appeared that the DJIA had more fluctuations compared to the 
KLCI which showed a flattish trend during the period under study. This 
observation was based on the fact that the data used was absolute figures and the 
range of values for DJIA was from 8691 to 13930 whereas the range of values for 
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KLCI was from 860 to 1445. The y axis was from 0 to 16000, thus making it 
easier to see the fluctuations only for DJIA. 
 
      Instead of the absolute values, the variances in closing indices for DJIA and 
the KLCI was then used to plot the graphs 
 
Chart 2: Variances in the Month End Indices for DJIA and KLCI 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      The graph showed that the variance in both the indices moved in tandem with 
each other i.e. when there was a positive variance for the DJIA, there was an 
upward movement, which was also reflected in the KLCI movement. The peaks 
for both indices in April 2007, December 2007 and April 2008 coincided. 
Similarly the sharp falls in November 2007, January 2008, June 2008 and October 
2008 were mirrored for both indices. This established the fact that there was a 
close and strong relationship between the two indices and that the KLCI is 
impacted by the financial crisis ( as manifested in the DJIA). 
       
      Statistical analysis -as per Table 4 – revealed that for the period under review, 
the DJIA had a mean index of 12208.05 with a standard deviation of 1496.32 
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compared to KLCI which had a mean index of 1229.52 with a standard deviation 
of 174.58. This meant that the DJIA was more volatile than the KLCI. The study 
however confirmed that the KLCI is very strongly influenced by the DJIA – as it 
is positively and significantly correlated to the DJIA with a rho ( r ) of 0.943 and a 
significant level of 0.01 (two tailed) with a confidence level of 0.99. Statistically 
significant does not mean that the results are conclusive. It just indicates that the 
difference is unlikely to be due to chance. 
Table 4 below interprets the value of rho. 
 
Table 4: Values of rho or the correlation coefficient r 
                
-1 -0.7 -0.3 0 0.3 0.7 1   
                
                
  perfect 
negative 
 strong 
negative 
weak 
negative     perfect indepen- 
dence 
weak 
positive 
strong 
positive 
 perfect  
positive 
  
                
 
      The second statistical analysis was performed on all the six sector indices and 
the KLCI – to determine whether the individual sectors, in particular the KLFI, 
had a close relationship with the KLCI. The results are tabulated in Table 5 
overleaf.  
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Table 5: Sector analysis - Correlations and descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N Correlation 
KL Composite Index 1229.5271 174.58531 24 1.0 
KL Financial Index 9293.4750 2328.74119 24 .570 
KL Industrial Index 2535.6504 268.65813 24 .909 
KL Consumer Index 308.0433 22.89457 24 .810 
KL Property Index 860.6025 213.58036 24 .895 
KL Construction Index 250.7008 54.54364 24 .949 
KL Plantation Index 6260.5492 1380.86258 24 .704 
 
All six sectors exhibited a positive correlation with the KLCI, at the significant 
level of 0.01 (with a confidence level of 0.99). For five sectors (excluding KLFI), 
the indices are highly correlated to the KLCI changes, as evidenced from the 
above table. For instance, the KL Plantation Index, which had a correlation of 
0.704, comprises of commodity counters and the prices of these stocks would 
immediately reflect the changes in the global commodity prices – e.g. when the 
price of crude oil plummeted, the price of crude palm oil too dived and this 
emphasizes that the plantation sector moves very closely with the KLCI. Similarly 
for the other sectors, the global crisis concerns would affect the industrial output, 
e.g. electronic and electrical industries; the consumer spending; the property 
values and the construction and infra-structure projects. However in the case of 
KLFI, the rho was 0.57 which indicated that while the sector would react 
positively to the volatility in the KLCI, it would be at a more restrained level. 
Underlying factors viz. the fundamentals of the banks which determine their 
financial strength, would also influence the share price, but to a lesser degree. 
These fundamentals would include the liquidity position, the existing and the 
expected non-performing loans, the future loan growth, investment and expansion 
policies etc.  
 
      While the correlations between the other sectors and the KLCI are stronger, for 
the purpose of this study, the outcome of the analysis does establish that there is a 
strong and positive correlation between the KLFI and the KLCI at a significant 
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level at 0.01.  This then satisfies the expected outcome for the KLFI being closely 
linked to the KLCI. 
 
      Finally statistical analysis is performed on the final set of data which is in fact 
the objective of this study. The price changes of the six selected banks (Affin, 
AMMB, Commerce, Maybank, PBB and RHB) were compared to the index 
changes in the KLCI. Expected outcome is that there should be a relationship 
between the two which would indicate that the Malaysian banking stocks are 
impacted by the financial crisis. The results as summarized below reveal that the 
correlation for all the six banking stocks is positive. The impact of the KLCI 
strongly influences the banking stocks. However some of the counters have a 
stronger link than others. Table 5 below lists the rho for the six banking stocks 
together with their mean and standard deviation. 
 
Table 6: Bank-wise - Correlations and descriptive statistics   
 Mean Std. 
Deviation 
N Correlation 
KL Composite Index 1245.5639 159.41333 23 1.0 
Affin Bank Berhad (Affin) 2.1339 .41127 23 0.930 
Arab Merchant Holdings 
Berhad (AMMB) 
3.6009 .64915 23 0.898 
Bumiputra Holdings Malaysia 
Berhad (Commerce) 
9.5461 1.56039 23 0.941 
Malayan Banking Berhad 
(Maybank ) 
9.2300 2.04395 23 0.790 
Public Banking Berhad (PBB) 9.9100 1.00273 23 0.512 
RHB Capital Berhad (RHB) 4.6552 .77973 23 0.822 
 
      While PBB has the lowest correlation with KLCI, rho being 0.512, and a mean 
of 9.9100 with a standard deviation of 1.00273, its price movements are not as 
volatile as Commerce which has the closest rho with KLCI at 0.941 with a lower 
mean of 9.5461 and a broader standard deviation of 1.56039. This means that the 
volatility of Commerce is higher than PBB and it moves more in tandem with the 
KLCI index changes  
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      PBB’s lower correlation is due to its underlying strengths i.e. lowest non-
performing ratio in the industry and high dividend payouts. PBB is in fact the most 
expensive banking stock in Asia, according to a Business Times report dated 15 
December 2008, and its share price had come down the least, sliding down by 32 
per cent since January 2008 compared to the regional average of over 50 per cent. 
The same source quoted PBB as smelling like roses.  
 
      In the case of Maybank, which had a correlation rho of 0.790 with the KLCI, 
other underlying issues too came into play in determining the stock price. This 
could be attributed to the erosion of investor confidence coupled in part due to 
herd instinct – arising from the bank’s large investments in Bank Internasional 
Indonesia and the MCB Bank in Pakistan. Firstly, the price paid for the 
acquisitions was deemed to be too high and secondly the perceived potential losses 
arising from regulatory risk in Indonesia and sovereign risk in Pakistan did not go 
well with the investors. 
 
      Despite the different banks displaying variations in their rho, all six banks 
have exhibited a positive correlation – which confirms the expected outcome of 
this study. 
 
6.0   CONCLUSION 
The findings of this study can be summarized as follows: 
 
      The current global financial crisis which originated from the US has impacted 
all sectors of its economy and the performance of the various stock exchange 
indices in the US are testimony to this. The DJIA which had been selected for the 
purpose of this study had fallen by 43 per cent from 14092.43 in October 2007 to 
8048.69 in November 2008 . Locally the KLCI had also fallen by 43% from its 
peak of 1514.31 in January 2007 to 867.04 in November 2008.  
      The sector analysis proved that all six sectors have been impacted by the KLCI 
(a.k.a. the financial crisis) and that the banking shares which are categorized under 
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the KL Financial Index were similarly adversely affected. The KLFI reduced from 
its highest index of 11280.38 ( July 2007 ) to its low of 6616.46 – i.e. by 41 per 
cent which is comparable to the reduction of 43 per cent in the KLCI. This 
indicates the strong relationship between these two indices and that the financial 
sector does influence the KLCI. 
 
      And finally the reduction in the share prices during the period under study 
indicate that the bank stocks are indeed affected by the reduction in the KLCI – 
Affin’s share price dropped by 57 per cent, AMMB’s and Maybank’s by 56 per 
cent , Commerce by 52 per cent , RHB by 42 per cent and PBB by only 26 per 
cent . All price reductions (except for PBB) have been at the level of the KLCI 
reduction which supports our study that the Malaysian banking stocks have been 
impacted by the global financial crisis. 
 
      In conclusion, it is very important for the Malaysian investor to closely 
monitor the economic development in the US as signs of improvement in the US 
will lead to improvement in our local equity market, as investor confidence 
returns. 
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7.0 Appendix A 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Table 7: Month end closing indices - DJIA & KLCI 
Month DJIA DJIA % 
change 
KLCI KLCI % change 
3/1/2007 12621.69 na 1189.35 na 
1/2/2007 12268.63 -2.80 1196.45 0.60 
1/3/2007 12354.35 0.70 1246.87 4.21 
2/4/2007 13062.91 5.74 1322.25 6.05 
1/5/2007 13627.64 4.32 1346.89 1.86 
1/6/2007 13408.62 -1.61 1354.38 0.56 
2/7/2007 13211.99 -1.47 1373.71 1.43 
1/8/2007 13357.74 1.10 1273.93 -7.26 
4/9/2007 13895.63 4.03 1336.30 4.90 
1/10/2007 13930.01 0.25 1413.65 5.79 
1/11/2007 13371.72 -4.01 1396.98 -1.18 
3/12/2007 13264.82 -0.80 1445.03 3.44 
2/1/2008 12650.36 -4.63 1393.25 -3.58 
1/2/2008 12266.39 -3.04 1357.40 -2.57 
3/3/2008 12262.89 -0.03 1247.52 -8.09 
1/4/2008 12820.13 4.54 1279.86 2.59 
1/5/2008 12638.32 -1.42 1276.10 -0.29 
2/6/2008 11350.01 -10.19 1186.57 -7.02 
11/7/2008 11378.02 0.25 1163.09 -1.98 
11/8/2008 11543.55 1.45 1100.50 -5.38 
2/9/2008 10850.66 -6.00 1018.68 -7.43 
1/10/2008 9336.93 -13.95 863.61 -15.22 
3/11/2008 8829.04 -5.44 866.14 0.29 
1/12/2008 8691.33 -1.56 860.68 -0.63 
Correlation coefficient = r = 0.69 
Coefficient of determination = r 2 = 0.48 
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Table 8: Month end closing indices – KLCI and KL Financial Index 
Month KLCI KLCI % 
change 
KL Financial 
 Index 
KL 
Financial 
index % 
change 
3/1/2007 1189.35 na 9599.04 na 
1/2/2007 1196.45 0.60 9893.25 3.06 
1/3/2007 1246.87 4.21 10246.53 3.57 
2/4/2007 1322.25 6.05 10583.46 3.29 
1/5/2007 1346.89 1.86 10706.55 1.16 
1/6/2007 1354.38 0.56 10903.90 1.84 
2/7/2007 1373.71 1.43 11280.58 3.45 
1/8/2007 1273.93 -7.26 10449.67 -7.37 
4/9/2007 1336.30 4.90 10551.92 0.98 
1/10/2007 1413.65 5.79 11238.79 6.51 
1/11/2007 1396.98 -1.18 10715.06 -4.66 
3/12/2007 1445.03 3.44 10905.35 1.78 
2/1/2008 1393.25 -3.58 10602.26 -2.78 
1/2/2008 1357.40 -2.57 10166.64 -4.11 
3/3/2008 1247.52 -8.09 9579.43 -5.78 
1/4/2008 1279.86 2.59 9944.57 3.81 
1/5/2008 1276.10 -0.29 9792.63 -1.53 
2/6/2008 1186.57 -7.02 8746.18 -10.69 
11/7/2008 1163.09 -1.98 9077.09 3.78 
11/8/2008 1100.50 -5.38 8871.66 -2.26 
2/9/2008 1018.68 -7.43 8252.38 -6.98 
1/10/2008 863.61 -15.22 6618.56 -19.80 
3/11/2008 866.14 0.29 6616.46 -0.03 
1/12/2008 860.68 -0.63 6710.44 1.42 
Correlation coefficient = r = 0.90 
Coefficient of determination = r 2 = 0.82 
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     Table 9(a) : Month end closing indices KLCI & KL Financial, KL Industrial & KL Consumer indices 
Month KLCI KLCI 
% 
change 
KL 
Financial 
 Index 
KL 
Financial 
index % 
change 
KL 
Industrial 
Index 
KL 
Industrial 
index % 
change 
KL 
Consumer 
Index 
KL 
Consumer 
index % 
change 
3/1/2007 1189.35   9599.04   2357.60   273.74   
1/2/2007 1196.45 0.60 9893.25 3.06 2336.77 -0.88 278.49 1.74 
1/3/2007 1246.87 4.21 10246.53 3.57 2416.07 3.39 293.55 5.41 
2/4/2007 1322.25 6.05 10583.46 3.29 2582.36 6.88 309.59 5.46 
1/5/2007 1346.89 1.86 10706.55 1.16 2606.85 0.95 301.34 -2.66 
1/6/2007 1354.38 0.56 10903.90 1.84 2535.93 -2.72 310.03 2.88 
2/7/2007 1373.71 1.43 11280.58 3.45 2626.86 3.59 315.27 1.69 
1/8/2007 1273.93 -7.26 10449.67 -7.37 2479.35 -5.62 305.00 -3.26 
4/9/2007 1336.30 4.90 10551.92 0.98 2653.46 7.02 325.47 6.71 
1/10/2007 1413.65 5.79 11238.79 6.51 2745.95 3.49 335.85 3.19 
1/11/2007 1396.98 -1.18 10715.06 -4.66 2913.46 6.10 331.48 -1.30 
3/12/2007 1445.03 3.44 10905.35 1.78 3014.43 3.47 343.89 3.74 
2/1/2008 1393.25 -3.58 10602.26 -2.78 2949.65 -2.15 330.32 -3.95 
1/2/2008 1357.40 -2.57 10166.64 -4.11 2878.64 -2.41 328.12 -0.67 
3/3/2008 1247.52 -8.09 9579.43 -5.78 2621.09 -8.95 316.61 -3.51 
1/4/2008 1279.86 2.59 9944.57 3.81 2695.19 2.83 331.55 4.72 
1/5/2008 1276.10 -0.29 9792.63 -1.53 2690.57 -0.17 332.72 0.35 
2/6/2008 1186.57 -7.02 8746.18 -10.69 2558.26 -4.92 320.94 -3.54 
11/7/2008 1163.09 -1.98 9077.09 3.78 2420.63 -5.38 303.71 -5.37 
11/8/2008 1100.50 -5.38 8871.66 -2.26 2293.15 -5.27 300.27 -1.13 
2/9/2008 1018.68 -7.43 8252.38 -6.98 2228.32 -2.83 290.70 -3.19 
1/10/2008 863.61 -15.22 6618.56 -19.80 2085.64 -6.40 264.77 -8.92 
3/11/2008 866.14 0.29 6616.46 -0.03 2088.17 0.12 277.08 4.65 
1/12/2008 860.68 -0.63 6710.44 1.42 2077.21 -0.52 272.55 -1.63 
Correlation coefficient 
= r   0.90  0.58  0.76 
Coefficient of 
determination = r 2   0.82  0.34  0.57 
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Table 9(b) : Month end closing indices KLCI & KL Property, KL Construction & KL Plantation  
indices 
 
 
 
 
Month KLCI KLCI 
% 
change 
KL 
Property 
Index 
KL 
Property 
index % 
change 
KL 
Construc 
tion Index 
KL 
Construc
tion 
index % 
change 
KL 
Plantation 
Index 
KL 
Plantation 
index % 
change 
3/1/2007 1189.35   750.50   237.53   4509.08   
1/2/2007 1196.45 0.60 820.45 9.32 252.00 6.09 4704.31 4.33 
1/3/2007 1246.87 4.21 922.91 12.49 270.76 7.44 5091.13 8.22 
2/4/2007 1322.25 6.05 1061.75 15.04 280.92 3.75 5791.99 13.77 
1/5/2007 1346.89 1.86 1032.93 -2.71 299.17 6.50 6130.20 5.84 
1/6/2007 1354.38 0.56 1128.37 9.24 299.96 0.26 6000.90 -2.11 
2/7/2007 1373.71 1.43 1209.93 7.23 312.27 4.10 6156.58 2.59 
1/8/2007 1273.93 -7.26 1072.85 -11.33 287.57 -7.91 5638.42 -8.42 
4/9/2007 1336.30 4.90 1093.69 1.94 303.87 5.67 6406.12 13.62 
1/10/2007 1413.65 5.79 1094.82 0.10 316.59 4.19 7395.35 15.44 
1/11/2007 1396.98 -1.18 1031.14 -5.82 302.48 -4.46 7252.72 -1.93 
3/12/2007 1445.03 3.44 1035.66 0.44 313.04 3.49 8089.30 11.53 
2/1/2008 1393.25 -3.58 954.45 -7.84 301.79 -3.59 7645.65 -5.48 
1/2/2008 1357.40 -2.57 878.17 -7.99 272.13 -9.83 8421.24 10.14 
3/3/2008 1247.52 -8.09 782.61 -10.88 242.13 -11.02 7490.15 -11.06 
1/4/2008 1279.86 2.59 813.22 3.91 238.69 -1.42 7764.19 3.66 
1/5/2008 1276.10 -0.29 790.19 -2.83 229.12 -4.01 7996.36 2.99 
2/6/2008 1186.57 -7.02 698.68 -11.58 207.82 -9.30 7924.93 -0.89 
11/7/2008 1163.09 -1.98 675.23 -3.36 209.51 0.81 6438.08 -18.76 
11/8/2008 1100.50 -5.38 664.80 -1.54 196.87 -6.03 5779.54 -10.23 
2/9/2008 1018.68 -7.43 620.56 -6.65 180.88 -8.12 4853.55 -16.02 
1/10/2008 863.61 -15.22 509.46 -17.90 146.30 -19.12 4623.89 -4.73 
3/11/2008 866.14 0.29 510.91 0.28 154.71 5.75 4267.03 -7.72 
1/12/2008 860.68 -0.63 501.18 -1.90 160.71 3.88 3900.47 -8.59 
Correlation coefficient 
= r   0.69  0.82  0.82 
Coefficient of 
determination = r 2   0.67  0.57  0.57 
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Table 10(a): Month end closing index for KLCI and closing prices for Affin, AMMB & 
Commerce 
Month KLCI KLCI 
% 
change 
Affin Affin % 
change 
AMMB AMMB 
% 
change 
Commerce Commerce 
% change 
3/1/2007 1189.35   1.89   3.16   8.84   
1/2/2007 1196.45 0.60 2.15 13.76 3.30 4.43 8.99 1.70 
1/3/2007 1246.87 4.21 2.27 5.58 3.72 12.73 9.56 6.34 
2/4/2007 1322.25 6.05 2.29 0.88 3.95 6.18 10.38 8.58 
1/5/2007 1346.89 1.86 2.30 0.44 3.87 -2.03 11.60 11.75 
1/6/2007 1354.38 0.56 2.44 6.09 4.27 10.34 11.40 -1.72 
2/7/2007 1373.71 1.43 2.66 9.02 4.65 8.90 11.50 0.88 
1/8/2007 1273.93 -7.26 2.48 -6.77 4.29 -7.74 10.62 -7.65 
4/9/2007 1336.30 4.90 2.45 -1.21 4.29 0.00 10.43 -1.79 
1/10/2007 1413.65 5.79 2.86 16.73 4.22 -1.63 11.21 7.48 
1/11/2007 1396.98 -1.18 2.53 -11.54 4.02 -4.74 10.43 -6.96 
3/12/2007 1445.03 3.44 2.55 0.79 3.80 -5.47 10.72 2.78 
2/1/2008 1393.25 -3.58 2.31 -9.41 3.66 -3.68 10.04 -6.34 
1/2/2008 1357.40 -2.57 2.21 -4.33 3.72 1.64 10.23 1.89 
3/3/2008 1247.52 -8.09 1.96 -11.31 3.44 -7.53 9.70 -5.18 
1/4/2008 1279.86 2.59 2.01 2.55 3.76 9.30 9.70 0.00 
1/5/2008 1276.10 -0.29 2.04 1.49 3.98 5.85 9.50 -2.06 
2/6/2008 1186.57 -7.02 1.87 -8.33 3.18 -20.10 8.00 -15.79 
11/7/2008 1163.09 -1.98 1.84 -1.60 3.32 4.40 8.75 9.38 
11/8/2008 1100.50 -5.38 1.85 0.54 3.06 -7.83 8.35 -4.57 
2/9/2008 1018.68 -7.43 1.60 -13.51 2.96 -3.27 7.65 -8.38 
1/10/2008 863.61 -15.22 1.22 -23.75 2.14 -27.70 6.10 -20.26 
3/11/2008 866.14 0.29 1.30 6.56 2.06 -3.74 5.95 -2.46 
1/12/2008 860.68 -0.63 1.25 -3.85 2.22 7.77 5.55 -6.72 
Correlation 
coefficient = r  0.78  0.74   0.79 
Coefficient of 
determination = r 2  0.62  0.54   0.63 
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Table 10(b): Month end closing index for KLCI and closing prices for Maybank, PBB & RHB 
 
 
 
 
Month KLCI KLCI 
% 
change 
Maybank  Maybank 
% 
change 
PBB PBB % 
change 
RHB 
Cap 
RHB % 
change 
3/1/2007 1189.35   11.07   8.46   3.45   
1/2/2007 1196.45 0.60 10.98 -0.81 8.42 -0.47 4.17 20.87 
1/3/2007 1246.87 4.21 11.24 2.37 8.56 1.66 4.55 9.11 
2/4/2007 1322.25 6.05 10.88 -3.20 9.14 6.78 4.50 -1.10 
1/5/2007 1346.89 1.86 10.97 0.83 9.62 5.25 4.52 0.44 
1/6/2007 1354.38 0.56 10.88 -0.82 9.48 -1.46 4.59 1.55 
2/7/2007 1373.71 1.43 11.15 2.48 9.86 4.01 5.81 26.58 
1/8/2007 1273.93 -7.26 10.51 -5.74 9.27 -5.98 5.10 -12.22 
4/9/2007 1336.30 4.90 9.97 -5.14 9.86 6.36 5.77 13.14 
1/10/2007 1413.65 5.79 10.51 5.42 11.00 11.56 6.10 5.72 
1/11/2007 1396.98 -1.18 10.70 1.81 10.31 -6.27 5.58 -8.52 
3/12/2007 1445.03 3.44 10.96 2.43 10.90 5.72 5.62 0.72 
2/1/2008 1393.25 -3.58 11.24 2.55 11.30 3.67 5.14 -8.54 
1/2/2008 1357.40 -2.57 8.67 -22.86 10.50 -7.08 4.77 -7.20 
3/3/2008 1247.52 -8.09 8.19 -5.54 10.50 0.00 4.59 -3.77 
1/4/2008 1279.86 2.59 7.76 -5.25 11.40 8.57 4.81 4.79 
1/5/2008 1276.10 -0.29 7.27 -6.31 11.50 0.88 4.85 0.83 
2/6/2008 1186.57 -7.02 6.83 -6.05 10.40 -9.57 4.13 -14.85 
11/7/2008 1163.09 -1.98 7.71 12.88 10.40 0.00 4.11 -0.48 
11/8/2008 1100.50 -5.38 7.61 -1.30 10.20 -1.92 4.09 -0.49 
2/9/2008 1018.68 -7.43 6.69 -12.09 10.00 -1.96 4.00 -2.20 
1/10/2008 863.61 -15.22 5.35 -20.03 8.35 -16.50 3.06 -23.50 
3/11/2008 866.14 0.29 5.15 -3.74 8.50 1.80 3.76 22.88 
1/12/2008 860.68 -0.63 5.00 -2.91 8.30 -2.35 3.52 -6.38 
Correlation 
coefficient = r    0.52  0.82  0.64 
Coefficient of 
determination 
= r 2    0.27  0.68  0.41 
